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JÁNOS KORNAI’S EVALUATION  
OF THE TRANSITIONAL PATH
Recent trends in the economies  
and societies of hungary and some western 
balkans countries based on János Kornai’s 
insights
In this essay, we are trying to focus  on and  review Kornai’s reflections and observations 
regarding to the achievements of  former socialist economies and their progress on the 
transitional path. Kornai was a witness to dramatic events that accompanied  the collapse 
of socialism from its very beginnings. Therefore, he is very much competent to evaluate 
the outcomes of the “Great Transformation”, the process in which many hopes and expec-
tations were invested.  As a brave, honest and ever-present scientist, Kornai  strives to ob-
jectively present and critically evaluate the achievements of Eastern European transitional 
economies. He does not limit his analysis of transition solely to the economic sphere, but 
critically considers the overall changes in the society, politics and economy. This paper reli-
es on his insights and observations while studying  Serbia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, in 
particular. It turns out that his assessments are absolutely relevant for those countries, the 
results of their transition being significantly lower than in other former socialist countries 
he analyzes, primarily because of the traumatic break-up of  former Yugoslavia and conti-
nuous political instability that followed  in its newly established states. 
Key words: János Kornai, transition,  Great Transformation, transitional path, building 
capitalism , consequences of transition
Introduction 
Kornai Janos’s work as an economist is impressive. It has been very much influential and has 
served  as an inspiration to generations of economists.  Even if we focuse on a single issue such 
as transiton, it is rather impossible to encompass all the abundance of his analitical observations 
and his study of such a big and important issue for all the former communist countries. The 
scope of this paper does not allow us to mention all of Kornai’s contributions to the study of the 
process of transiton, the issue that he adressed critically and objectively. This paper will, there-
fore, address only some of the facts of transition that are of  close  interest to us and in relation to 
the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe. The issues of a rather  universal character are of 
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our special interest since they are, to a high degree, related to the Western Balkans. Herewith, we 
do not intend to discuss and challenge Kornai’s observations, but only to highlight those that are 
relevant to our understanding of the process of transition in the Western Balkans. 
Kornai’s economic and political views were largely shaped on one hand  by his experience 
of the Second World War, his desire for freedom and for the „Western world“ that epitomized 
it, and on the other hand by the world he came from – his own country. Kornai has not been 
a  strict follower of any of the particular schools of the economic  thought.  His economic 
thought is rather heterogeneous and therefore he constantly challenges and re-examines his 
observations.  
In this paper we will  single out some of his observations on transition that have inspired the 
very subject of this paper. Even though Kornai does not speak about the countries of the Western 
Balkans per se, his thoughts can be easily related to its economic reality and its problems.
Hereafter we will focus on Kornai’s observations with regard to transition as related to the 
issues of legislation, democracy, populism and economy in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
1. Some methodological aspects
Although the focus of our attention was primarily on the analysis of Kornai’s insight into the 
processes of transition and recent developments in Hungaria, in the wake of his approach and 
insight, the observed characteristics, ideas and evaluations, we have paid attention to two cases, 
the Republic of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H). They represent well the Western 
Balkans countries outside the EU. These countries were excluded from Kornai’s analysis of the 
transition process in the former socialist countries. Both have common characteristics related 
to the socialist heritage of the former Yugoslavia and its socialist system, as do Hungary and 
other countries of the former Eastern bloc. They are the beneficiaries of the financial and techni-
cal assistance of international multilateral financial institutions and are under their monitoring 
(IMF, World Bank).
In his papers we have consulted    Kornai analyzes the processes of transition and pays close 
attention to current developments on the economic and political field in Hungary. The primary 
objective of this research was to analyze the views and evaluations of the great economist Janos 
Kornai and then, in the wake of his  choice of topics and open questions, our intention was to 
focus  on the same issues and problems in countries that present well the Western Balkans region 
. In that sense, we have tried to draw parallels in the case of Serbia and B&H in the field of eco-
nomics and social change.
 Given the breadth and scope of the topic in the paper, we could not go into excessively deep 
analyzes of numerous open economic and social issues, but with some fundamental characteris-
tics of the observed economies, societies, their transition and current social situations. We used 
data from official statistics of the observed countries as well as relevant analyzes and studies of 
significant economic and social topics.
2.Transition
Kornai’s approach to the study of transition is all-encompassing, such as is his approach to the 
study of socialism in the form in which it once existed. Kornai himself points out to the fact that 
while writing his book The Socialist System he tried „to grab the interaction and interdepen-
KÖZ-GAZDASÁG 2020/3154
dence among political structure, ideology, ownership relations, the typical behavior of various 
actor-in short,  the systemic properties. In the same time to show the dynamics of the system.“ 
(Blanchard  1999. p.441).
According to Kornai the success of reforms depends on the initial conditions and, therefore, 
it should be based on their appraisal. The process of transition opened up various and difficult 
questions that demanded answers and provoked attempts and efforts of finding them. The ans-
wers were sometimes oversimplified, they often remained outside the realm of the political and 
social context, although a careful contextual anlysis could have helped recognizing wich answer 
was right or wrong, timely or outdated.(Blanchard O. 1999. p. 442). 
Kornai’s  describes  certain segments of the Hungarian society, such as the functioning of 
political parties, the state of democracy, autocratic tendencies, independent functioning of 
the legislative system and the rule of law. (Kornai 2006).  His observations and conclusions in 
relation to those correspond, to a high degree, to those in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(B&H), which is often by an outer observer described as a „failed state“. 
In his paper ’’The great transformation of Central Eastern Europe, Succes and Disappointment’’ 
(2006) Kornai writes about the Eastern Europe group of  successful countries that managed to 
join the EU in 2004 (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia 
and Slovenia). In spite of the individual  differences that exist among them, these countries share 
a lot in common and, therefore, they have deserved to be studied all together.  
However, there are countries which, (since 90’s and later on to today) have faced a vast eco-
nomic, political and social downfall (Serbia, B&H, Montenegro, Macedonia, etc.) 
The countries that Kornai analyses are the ones that have transitoned from socialism to capi-
talism in a peaceful manner. The transformation was complete and parallel in all the spheres of 
their economic and political structures.  When we focus our attention to the countries that can 
be labelled by the term „transitional failures“, it can be concluded that their transformation was 
joined  by war and agression. The recovery of the countries of former Yugoslavia (apart, per-
haps, from Slovenia) which underwent this painful process, was monitored by the international 
community, primarily through its finacial institutions, that functioned as creditors and financers 
of the economic recovery of those politically, socially and demografically devastated countries. 
Transition to the liberal market economy was a must and an obvious fact. Since decades are 
needed to be able to take the perspective and  assess the overall success of the transiton,  Kornai 
avoids the final assessment with regard to the success of the „old-new“ model, even though the 
considerable rise of the economic growth rates could be taken as a very good sign of it.  (Kornai 
2006. p.213)
Kornai points out that transition to the capitalist system does not necessarily result in 
democracy. However, the reverse proces is not possible, since there is no democracy without 
capitalism.  
The transformation was implemented in an incredibly fast way, within the time frame of 10 
to 15 years. The introduction of the political party system in which each party competes for its 
voters represents the beginnings of parliamentary democracy.  Even though some economists 
suggested  faster transiton, the vast majority of the citizens of those countries were in favour of 
gradual changes, which is a view that Kornai himself shares. Kornai’s fears and suspicions with 
regard to the quick transition and fast privatisation to the capitalist market economy turned to be 
true in the case of certain countries that came into existence after the fall of former Yugoslavia. 
Apart from Slovenia, which had „luck“ not to have had the help of the IMF  and WB during its 
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transiton, in the rest of the countries of the Western Balkans the privatisation resembled a „revo-
lution“ -  in other words, it was the „privatisation at any cost“. The results of the privatisation 
were, in the least, rather questionable. The privatisation has not been yet finalised, however, the 
firms that have been „in the process of waiting“ ended up being bunkrupt and devastated.  
However, inspite of the numerous shortcomings and dissapointments that follow the process 
of transition, Kornai points out  to a certain degree of subjectivity that is present in the attempts 
to assess its success and its final results. In his system of values civil rights and human rights are 
highly prioritised, which is largely influenced by his personal and frightful experience of living 
in a totalitarian regime.
’’I consider the transformation of the Central Eastern European region a success story 
because it established a capitalist economic system within a historically brief timeframe, thereby 
placing our nations again on the course of development leading towards the main direction of 
history. It is not that I love capitalism. It is not a very likeable system. But I hold those of its cha-
racteristics dear that are indispensable to the realization of the values I profess. In the long run, 
the economic advantages of capitalism will become manifest in the Central Eastern European 
region too: a sustainable higher growth rate of production productivity and consumption than 
the one experienced under the socialist system, technical innovation, entrepreneurial spirit, and 
together with the above, an increasing level of prosperity for society as a whole. I also consider 
the values of economic growth and the increase in the standard of living it brings to be primary 
values…..the very existence of a capitalist system is an indispensable precondition for a functi-
oning democracy. These are those benefits that according to my ordering of values overshadow 
the disadvantage of capitalism. I acknowledge that there are others who subscribe to a different 
system for weghting the advantages and disadvantages betwen them.’’(Kornai 2006.p.226) .
The Czech Republic, Hungary, Croatia, Slovakia and Slovenia used to belong to the Austro-
Hungarian Empire which, even though it has not functioned on fully democratic principles, was 
excellent at implementation of the rule of  law and  protection of personal property. Therefore it 
was, somehow, expected that such memories of the rule of law and human freedom have been 
saved in the minds of the citizens of those countries and have eventually mirrored themselves in 
non-formalized rules of their social functioning. Serbia, Macedonia, Romania, Bulgaria, Bosnia 
and Montenegro did not have the continous access to the Western culture all the way to the 
beginning of the 19th century,  which could serve as one of the explanations to the failure of the 
process of transiton in the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe. 
Kornai is very much aware of  numerous problems that arose in the process of transition 
which he denies to alleviate and put in disguise. Some of those are related to the  significant 
fall of the standard of living, especially for certain groups of population, followed by a huge 
discrepancy between the income and the costs of living, huge rates of unemployment and work 
loss, as well as the omnipresent insecurity and unpredictability of living. He also mentions the 
variability of prices, interest rates, and exchange rates,  that citizens of those countries were not 
used to, as well as the considerable rise of criminal and corruption rates. Even though corruption 
was present in socialist political systems, presently it has become  much more widespread in all 
the society’s segments, political, economic and cultural, and also appearing in small- and lar-
ge-scale  private transactions. ’’Everyone is angry, and-often unwillingly, many people get dirty. 
It is almost impossible to avoid becoming involved in some transaction where one or another 
of the parties engages in certain shady transactions, and where either the client, the citizen, the 
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seller or the buyer, would not attempt to bribe, or be involved in a phoney tax evasion scheme of 
some sort’’(Kornai 2006.p. 232). 
Corruption can be singled out as one of the numerous problems that are faced by Serbia 
and B&H, which are, with regard to this issue, among the most corrupted countries in Europe. 
Various research that testify to this are done, together with the annual ratings and reports that 
inform the public about the state of corruption, and are mostly done by foreign investigators 
and NGO’s in these countries. It is undoubtedly that corruption is harmful and detrimental to 
the social and political well-being of these countries, considerably slowing down their econo-
mic growth. Consequentially, the following question comes very much naturally: why and what 
causes such high rates of corruption?  Majority of the countries of the Western Balkans are seen 
by foreign observes as ’capture’ states that are ruled by certain interest groups that result from the 
interplay of the interests of the local politicians and tycoons The reports by foreign investigators 
and local NGO’s such as ’Transparency International’ show the constant interchange between 
very small improvements in the fight against the corruption and a very small deterioration in 
the rate of corruption. Among 176 countries that were investigated for corruption in 2016 and 
2017, Serbia took the 72nd pace (scoring 42 out of 100 points, 100 points meaning there is no 
corruption and 0 points testifying the highest level of corruption). B&H took the 83rd place with 
the score of 39 points.  (www.transparentnost.org.rs, https://ti-bih.org/)
However, if  ’big corruption’ creates problems, ’small corruption’ can make them even bigger. 
’Big corruption’ involves managers of public institutions, prosecutors, judges and representatives 
of the leading governmental institutions. Everyday encounters with corruption,  acts, gestures 
and behaviours it implies makes it  eventually a part of the ’normal’ lifestyle of the people in the 
Balkans. 
By the end of the text cited above, Kornai  does not deny the claim that the great transfor-
mation of the Central and Eastern European region could be fundamentally characterized as 
an unparalleled success. Kornai perceives „the great transformation“ primarily within the long 
historical context (not according to the  Keynes’ maxim – in the long run we are all dead) .
With regard to the results of the transition which took place via the velvet revolution, in his 
paper Vrh obrasca
Dno obrasca
’’Liberté , Égalité, Fraternité : Reflections on the Changes following the Collapse of Communism’’ 
(2010), Kornai questions the ultimate outcomes of  the revolutionary motto: Liberté , Égalité, 
Fraternité,  - freedom with regards to political rights, private property, free entrance to the mar-
ket and as well as freedom to choose between alternative goods and services. In relation to these, 
he concludes that huge progress took place. However, when it comes to equality among citizens, 
the gap between classes widened very quickly which caused aversion and repulsion towards the 
newly established political and economic system. Fraternity or, in other words, solidarity, is a 
widely accepted value but hardly implemented as such. Post-socialist countries inherited the 
premature welfare state. The vast majority of population prefer universal social rights, however, 
the necessary material resources are not sufficent for those ambitious aims to be reached. He 
finishes his paper by discussing various political options that could alleviate the contradicitons 
between the conflicting and inconsistent aims. (Kornai  2010.) 
As to the achievement of freedom, he summs it up in a following way: we enjoy the essen-
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tial achievements of freedom. It is a sad observation though, but at the same time an importat 
socio-psychological fact, is that not a large number of people value freedom to a high degree. 
Other basic needs are valued more highely. (Kornai 2010. p.383.). He is rather surprised by the 
fact that a considerably smaller number of people in post-socialist countries give the highest 
value to freedom then in those countries that had capitalist systems before 1989. Freedom is one 
of the biggest values of  liberal political and economic systems. 
It seems that, in the countries of mature market economies, the freedom  principle is nurtu-
red and cherished as one of the biggest values of the system per se. This principle is being conti-
nuously and publicly affirmed as the highest value of a certain society and therefore its citizens 
recognize, accept and value is importance. Kornai himself promotes the importance of this prin-
ciple and its affirmation through the system of education and different public media. To this we 
could add the proverbial saying that only when we lose something we learn to value it properly. 
It is not unusal that people in post-socialist countries do not value freedom enough. Freedom, 
in the first place, means taking responsibility for your own self and your family. Socialism, on 
the other hand, liberated people from the existential worries to a high degree – worries related 
to work and basic survival needs. 
Very much understandably, the gap between people, in terms of their economic and social 
equality, widened, more or less in all the post-socialist countries.  Therefore ’’the most important 
instrument of improving income distribution is to create increased equality of opportunities’’. 
On the first place in education. (Kornai 2010.p.388.)
Even though Kornai says that the process of transition is over (such claim is supported 
by various facts), in case the broadest social prespective is taken, it couldn’t be claimed so. 
Ultimately, Kornai deals with post-transitional abberations. From a strictly economic position, 
the transformation of property took place and the rules of capitalist economy were introduced, 
while the private sector and private initiative were given a considerable amount of freedom (the 
degree of which differs from one state to another).
Each transition has got its price and it is difficult not to fall under the impression that the 
price of the transition was high, especially in those countries that have been labelled as  the 
„transitional failures“. The break-up of Yugoslavia resulted in massive forced migrations, huge 
unemployment rates, social crushes, the rise of non-democratic tendencies and autocratic struc-
tures,  as well as in the breach  the autonomous  functioning of the legislative system being jeo-
pardised. To be even worse, the goverenments’ only resorts when it comes to their develompent 
strategies seem to be relying hugely on foreign investmenst  and stimulating small and medium 
enterprises.  
Geostrategic re-organisation in the Western Balkans had detrimental consequences on the 
society and the economy of this region. Along with this process, the process of transiton, that 
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was not the result of the free will of its citizens, took place2. The transitional process did not fol-
low the normal evolutional developement.
The initial implementation of democratic freedom in B&H  resulted in free political  elec-
tions in  which three nationalist parties won and very soon after that the civil war has started.   
Kornai takes a broad perspective in his analysis of  the transitional process. Understandably 
so, it is impossible to devote the equal amount of attention to all of its facets. However, he pays 
a lot of attention to social, historical, political and anthropological factors. It seems methodolo-
gicaly similar to  Polanyi’s  approach to analysis since our  ‘’need to discover the priorities of a 
society, the all-encompassing coherence of human inter-dependence, is the only  by which we 
can hope to overcome the complexites and contradictions of our times.’’ (Maciver  2003.p.13.)  
3.  Current economic and social results  of transition in 
Serbia and B&H
The countries of the Western Balkans (apart from Slovenia) have been in the state of permanent 
economic, political and social crisis since the 90’s.  Their economic growth is so slow that it still 
cannot reach the level of the national produce that those countries had before the civil war and 
at the beginning of the 90’s.   
The ruling development paradigm of the countries of the Western Balkans is based on struc-
tural reforms, encouragement of  enterpreneurship, the growth of small and medium-sized busi-
nesses, as well as  on the desperate attraction of foreign investment. Their economic policies are 
orthodox with hard budget constraints. 
Economic growth rates as measured by GDP growth have been very low throughout the 
post-conflict period. After the 2008 crisis, GDP growth rates decline. In some years, these have 
been negative in both countries. In 2016, the GDP growth rate in Serbia was positive, amoun-
ting to 3.3% annually and in 2017 the GDP growth rate was 2.0%. (Statistical Yearbook of the 
Republic of Serbia for 2018) After 2012, in which the GDP growth rate in BiH was negative, 
growth rates are positive, so that from 2015 to 2018, those in B&H amount to over 3% annually. 
However, these are very low rates of economic growth, given the very low starting point. The 
orthodox stabilization policy acted on macroeconomic stability so that B&H inflation from 2013 
to 2016 had negative growth rates. (Bulletin of the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
No.4.2018). Thanks to a similar macroeconomic policy, periods of pronounced inflation have 
also ended in Serbia in recent years.
The ’’Reforms’’ in Serbia and B&H were moving towards liberalization and opening up the 
country to free flows of goods and services. The liberalization of imports and the reduction of 
2  ’’Taking into account the fact that transition to capitalism is purely a technical problem, economic theories 
that are based on the neoclassical paradigm tended to ignore the fact that capitalism is much more than 
the alternative method of the re-location of resources. It is the lifestyle. Therefore, transition implemented 
by the strict state’s hand  imposed on the common citizen the institutional changes that are very much 
foreign and distant from the genuine living substrate of the communities in Central Eastern Europe. All 
that the common citizen succeeded to get is the  change one set of institutions with another, non of which 
they chose themselves free’’. (Pejović 2004 S. p.20) 
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customs and other barriers directly stimulated imports, causing many industries to collapse. 
Finally, rapid privatization was a great help to the decay. On that occasion, some businesses were 
being sold for nothing, and new owners were either failing or unwilling to maintain and raise 
production. Investors from labor-intensive industries are coming to Serbia i B&H  today. They 
are employing very low-skilled workforce for the lowest levels of processing with lowest wages. 
Often, these are investors who are engaging in moral hazard (they take government subsidies 
to hire domestic labor and sometimes simply  disappear). Foreign direct investment was often 
aimed at buying the domestic market.
Dramatically high and permanent unemployment rate together with the market reforms 
and transition (privatisation of the public firms) set on the stage in Serbia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (B&H) since the end of the 90’s. (N. Plakalović: 2016). During the last decades 
the unemployment rate in Serbia ranged from 30% to 21%, According to the records of official 
statistics in 2002 in B&H was 41.1% of the unemployed. After the monitoring methodology of 
unemployment changed and unemployment statistics monitored on the basis of surveys that 
anyone who is doing anything or is employed in the informal sector of the economy cannot be 
treated as unemployed. That’s why in 2006, unemployment is 31.1%, in 2018, 18,1% ( www.bhas.
ba). Unemployment rate in Serbia  (22%) and B&H (28%) in 2014. is the highest in the region of 
South East Europe. Only Macedonia has   level of unemployment as B&H. ( World Development 
Indicators, World Bank, 2016.) 
The average salaries in those two countries are among the lowest in Europe, as well as in 
comparison to other countries of the Western Balkans.  B&H, if not the poorest, it certainly 
is among one the poorest countries in Europe. The economy of Serbia is in a somewhat better 
position. 
Economic experts say that industrial production in Serbia is currently lagging behind the 
developed countries by three to five technological generations.  According to the latest official 
data available, Serbia’s 2017 industrial production was 44.2 percent lower than 1990 (before the 
breakup of Yugoslavia, wars and sanctions). In Gross value added by economic activites, the 
Serbian industry participates in 2017 with 15.1%, real estate business 7.3%, agriculture with 
6.0% and professional, scientific and technical activities with 4.0%. (Statistical Yearbook of the 
Republic of Serbia for 2018). The only ‘bright’ point is the last area where most of the exports 
are from the export of IT services. This is a bit problematic, though, as it is often a job where the 
domestic workforce is engaged in outsourcing arrangements. Participation of the Serbia industry 
in   in total GDP is extremely low given that in developed countries, participation of industry 
in 2015 ranges from 20% (in most developed countries) to 40% (China). Worldwide, industry’s 
share of GDP is around 30%. (Infiniti, 2019, p. 8). The 4.0 generation industry has enormous, 
exponential growth and increasing availability globally.
The position of the industry in the overall economic structure in B&H is worse than that of 
Serbia. In the structure of gross value added in 2016, the manufacturing industry accounted for 
13.1%, agriculture 5.6%, trade 13.9% and public administration 7.7% (http://www.bhas.gov.ba).
A key structural problem for Serbia and B&H is the low technological level of production 
that cannot influence the faster increase of economic growth rates. The trend of physical volume 
of production and gross value added is diverging. Serbia is at the top of the country in terms of 
increasing exports of goods. Paradoxically, this is not accompanied by GDP growth. Industry 
and exports surpluses are ‘’ pulling ‘’ by low-tech  manufacturing goods. It is good for the balance 
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of payments position but not for economic growth. Medium- and high-tech manufacturing 
domains account for one quarter of manufacturing .
According to official data of the Statistical Office of Serbia, total export of Serbia in 2017 
amounts to 16.997 million US dollars. Of that, the manufacturing industry accounts for 91% 
of exports, agriculture and forestry 5.8%, electricity 4.3%. Manufacture of motor vehicles and 
trailers accounted for 14.2% of the manufacturing industry, food products with 11.3%, basic 
metals with 10.4%, rubber and plastic products 9.0% and electrical equipment production 8.9%. 
(Statistical Yearbook of Serbia for 2018). Regardless of the weaknesses of the industry, almost all 
of the country’s exports are based on industrial production.
4. U-turn
Nearly fifteen years after the publication of his study of the transition process, Kornai com-
ments very critically on the current state and tendencies that are becoming more pronounced 
in Hungarian society. It is true that similar tendencies are present in other countries that were 
previously subject to its analysis. If this could be a consolation, then it is quite natural and expe-
cted that similar tendencies would be manifested in the countries of the Western Balkans, whose 
transition path was much more thorny (wars, sanctions, forced migration of population, de-in-
dustrialization…). Finally, this could lead to the conclusion that these unwanted processes have 
the character of a certain regularity.
In the study ’’Hungary’s U-Turn’’, Capitalism and Society (2015), Kornai points out to 
Hungary’s tendencies of moving away from the principles of democracy, as well as those of 
moving towards centralisation, autocracy, and interfering with the autonomous work of the exe-
cutive and legislative branches (Kornai  2015.p.4.)
Kornai also crticises the way in which  Hungarian Constitution and its fundametal laws were 
adopted in 2010: „In Hungary, the situatiuon has changed: the holders of power are able to ele-
vate any decision to the status of law quickly and without hindrance, at the push of a button.“ 
(Kornai  2015.p.4.) 
Prosecution service in Hungary is centralised organization an formaly it operates indepen-
dently from the rest of the governement. In practise the chief prosecutor is chosen by the holder 
of supreme power with formalistic appointment by the parliament. (Kornai  2015.p.5.) For this 
reason many affairs of corruption that are related to the holders of power and those close to them 
have been covered up. On the other hand, the legislative system does not neglect similar affairs 
that are related to the members and supporters of the opposing parties. Such functioning of 
Hugary’s legislative bodies correspond fully to the way the legislative  systems  function in Serbia 
and B&H.  The actions against the political opponents are usually taken up just before elections 
– which is one of many typical ways in which such legislative systems function.
Constitutional  Court  where ‘’overwhelming majority of members of that Court were cho-
sen by the current prime minister- and soon all the members, without exception, will be Viktor 
Orban nominees. If their mandate is extended right now, this move, along with other similar 
moves, will shift the legal status of the country toward irreversible power relations. Thousends 
(yes, the number is no exaggeration) of discrete changes, all moving together in the same direc-
tion, create a new system.’’ (Kornai  2015.p.11-12. )
Goran Ilić, a person designated by the State’s Prosecutorial Council to deal with the issues of 
the autonomy of Serbia’s prosecution, says that the legislative system of Serbia does not provide 
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its prosecutors with autonomy. (Petrović  2017.) To be even worse, such legislative system itself 
creates the circumstances in which the interference with the autonomy of the prosecution’s work 
is possible. Heads of the Prosecution Committee are being appointed by the Parliament at the 
Government’s proposal. Therefore, instead of being led by  professional responsibility and with 
accordance to the Constitution, prosecutors owe responsibility for their actions to the Parliament 
and, in this way, their responsibility is being politicised. All the prosecutors, as well as the State’s 
Public Prosecutor are being appointed time-limited, six-year long mandates (in Serbia, as well as 
in Azerbaijan, Macedonia, Andorra, Ukrajina). The aim of such a system is to make prosecutors 
obliged to cooperate with the executive bodies and political parties.  Best judges claim publicly 
that the legislative system is only formally independent while, in fact, it is hugely dependent on 
the holders of the state’s political power. Judges feel threatened by those who have the power to 
decide about their destiny and those are the representatives of the executive governing bodies 
and political apparatus. A certain number of judges are  appointed not on the basis of their 
professional adequacy but due to the influential  connections they have with the holders of the 
political power. (Derikonjić  2016)  
In B&H, Constitutional Court  is comprised by nine members, out of  which, each two mem-
bers are representatives of the constitutional ethnic groups and are elected by the ruling politi-
cal parties. According to the words of Perić Branko, the judge in the court of B&H (Nezavisne 
novine, 10.12.2015) Constitutional Court took control over the legislative system, and went as 
far as to anull verdicts and their implementations, whithout having them professionally discus-
sed and taken into consideration. Around ninety verdicts of the Court were not implemented. 
On top of it, such actions, as a consequence, also change the constitutional structure of the 
country as it is was agreed upon by the Dayton Peace Agreement. The legislative system is abso-
lutely inefficient in its fight against corruption since it is being controlled by  political parties. 
5. Government sector and politics 
Kornai also speaks about the expansion of the government sector’s power into the domains of 
banking, energetics, public works, transportation and media. He points out to the trend of cent-
ralisation that has taken place since 2010.
The role of the state and its attitude towards the economic market is pretty much obvious. 
The problem is that the inevitable co-existnce and interaction of state and market have been 
seriously distorted in Hungary; symbiosis is subjected to political interests. (Kornai 2015.p.7.)
‘’We are not talking about case of ‘state capture’ carried out by a small group of  oligarch in 
order to establish regulations and pass measures in their own interests…... clientelism, a kind of 
feudal master-servant dependency, is asserted between the politician/bureaucrat and capitalist 
entrepreneur.’’ (Kornai  2015.p.7) It is ‘’Crony capitalism’’. Close connection between politics 
and business is a world-wide phenomenom and it is a fertile ground for the rise of corruption. 
Organisations that should fight against corruption are not independent. Corrupted politicians 
and businessmen know that powerful politicians will protect them against ‘’whistleblowers’’ who 
take personal risk in their fight against corruption, being absolutely unprotected and victims to 
of ‘’character assassination’’ campaigns. The Hungarian developments should serve as a warning 
for all those who insist unconditionally on increasing the role of the state, on extending and 
strenghtening regulations, without emphasizing the accompany-ing dangers .’’ It cannot be said 
whether Hungarian economic politics has swerved  towards the right or towards the left. Some of 
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its factes remind of socialism, but, in it’s very essence it is actually capitalist. (Kornai  2015.p.9.) 
Formal independence of the central bank is jeopardized since the Premier’s ‘’right-hand man’’ 
takes over this institution as its, only theoretically, „independent“ governor. All the members of 
the governing board are the loyal members of  the consolidated machinery of power.  
What makes difference with the Hungary’s case, is the fact that  members of the governing 
bodies of the Central Bank of B&H and the National Bank of Serbia are actually „renowned“ 
members of the ruling political parties by which they were appointed. Jobs in central banks are 
among the best paid ones  and therefore  the competition for those is very high. However, their 
professional staff can be appointed only by highly positioned party members of leading politi-
cial parties who, in other words, have a monopoly on these. Central banks are defined by law as 
independent institutions, but in reality they are very much dependent. Fortunately, the currency 
board is in power in B&H and therefore the Central Bank of  B&H   cannot lead their own inde-
pendent  monetary policy. Instead, it has to be based on the law according to which the monetary 
base  has to comply with the amount of the official exchange reserves. A few years ago, five banks 
in Serbia went bunkrupt due to which their deponents and tax payers lost 1200 million euros. 
Even though the National Bank of Serbia was responsible for bank monitoring, it did not take 
any responsibilty for what had happened. According to Aleksandar  Vučić, back then the prime 
minister of the country, tycoons found their way into those banks through their political con-
nections and then granted credits to related parties and tycoons that were not justifed by any of 
the adequate lawful procedures  for granting loans. The politician who provided the tycoons with 
the link to the banks was paid two million euros for his „service“. Those who were responsible for 
these illegal actions have never been prosecutes.
Political influence is predominant in all segments of the public sphere. As noted by Rosta 
Miklosh  (2015),  it is in action “overpolitization of the civil services’’. Although it speaks of a 
Hungarian case, this is even more relevant to Serbia and the B&H. In the context of soft budget 
constraint he concludes: ‘’The SBC syndrome makes the public administration system simply a 
tool of the political power of the incumbent government. In that case, public administration obe-
diently follows the commands of the political elite, without focusing on the trust of the citizens 
or on professional considerations’’. (Rosta  2015.p.8.)
Kornai  ‘’realize that there were several important factors behind the reversal: the grave mis-
takes made by governments and the political parties functioning within and outside the parli-
ament between 1990 and 2010, the spread of corruption, the trauma caused by the appearance 
of mass unemployment, the increase of social inequality, and the disappointment of a large 
proportion of the population after the high expectations brought by the change of system. The 
maturation of democracy is a long historical process, and Hungary has only just begun.’’(Kornai 
2015.p.19.) The causes for such a situation can be found in Hungary of twenty years ago that was 
ruled by the ‘’goulash communism’’  when population become accustomed to the paternalism of 
a heavy-handed regime.’’ (Kornai  2015.p.19.)  The way in which the socio-economic system is 
structured  influences strongly the  mentality of a nation and leaves a long-term consequences 
on its culture, which has been rather obviously proven in the case of Eastern Germany. Nations’s 
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culture can play a limiting role in the process of its transformation, the pace and intensity of its 
implementation.3
The economic crisis of 2008 has considerably slowed down the economic growth of the 
countries in transition, especially in the case of B&H and Serbia where in certain periods,  the 
rates of economic growth were even negative. On one hand this has slowed down the transitional 
processes and on the other it has caused the rise of populism in politics. 
‘’One manifestation of the U-turn is the methodical harassment of civil society’’. (Kornai 
2015.p.6.). Civil society organisations in Serbia and B&H are financed mostly by  American 
donors. Since a vast majority of the population of Serbia and B&H (speaking about its Serb 
entity), rather understandably,  has got a negative attitude towards the USA and the NATO, such 
organisations are treated mostly with indifference or  with an  amount of open animosity, such 
as in Serbia. Non-governmental organisations support open and public promotion of alternative 
views and opinions, which are contrary the dominant State’s politics. The animosity towards 
such organisations stems from the belief that their main aim is to change the society’s character 
and its system of values. “Autonomy“ of the public media is very much jeopardised, especially in 
B&H where the ruling parties intefere with their functioning through their  insiders. The public 
media mostly function as the voice of the leading political parties and their propaganda. Even 
the  media that seem to be independent and financed from abroad have their own strictly defined 
agendas and policies. The number of the objective media is very small and their aim is to lessen 
the power of the political propaganda and their brainwashing. 
6. The state of democracy 
It becomes apparent in most transition countries that the key problems of ‘new’ political systems 
in ‘building’ are a lack of democracy or at least a great lag behind the democracies of developed 
countries or the ‘ideal model’ that Kornai envisioned. That is why he is very critical of the state 
of democracy in his country.
On the essential importance of democracy Kornai  says the following:’’ Where the term 
‘democracy’ is an honor, the status of democracy is awarded or denied to the Hungarian form 
of governement by  journalists, political analysts, politicians or diplomats according to whether 
they hold a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the present Hungarian system. The terminolo-
gical confusion remains even when ‘democracy’ receives a defining attributive. The expression 
‘illiberal democracy’ was originally introduced to political science with pejorative connotations, 
3  The culture that rejects „Western standards“ seems to be one of the biggest obstacles to the social  trans-
formation of the countries of  Western Balkans.  Such culture is „collective“ in its very essence, aspiring 
towards egaliterianism and collective values. In such societies emotions are dominat and are used for the 
purposes of  the manupulation of masses. Collectives and groups are very important, as well as the wider 
family.  Emotions and irrationality prevail and, therefore, it is very difficult to explain certain actions and 
phenomena without having the understanding of the emotional sate of the involved ones. As a consqu-
ence, we seem rather irrational to an outsider, which we actually are.  Emotions of sympathy, love and 
hatered prevail , blindening  the clarity of vision and strongly influencing the process of decision making. 
Relationships are presonalized,  informal connections and structures are dominant. 
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while Viktor Orban uses the term ‘iliberal state’ with self-assured pride to describe his own sys-
tem’’.  (Kornai  2015. p.13).
Some of the features of developed democratic systems are the following: ‘’respect for mino-
rity rights; there are written and unwritten limits to what the majority, however large it may be, 
can do against the will of the minority. We could go on listing other important common featu-
res.’’ (Kornai  2015.p.14) Dictatorship is the other extreme. In between these two extrems, there 
are those countries in which neither of these rules  prevails. Kornai defines them as autocracies, 
Hungary being one of such countries. 
‘’Hungary is the first of the post-socialist democracies that has joined the autocracies, but 
there is no guarantee that it will be the only one. Tha balance of power might shift in other count-
ries in such a way as to turn them into autocracies’’. (Kornai  2015.p.14.) In 47 post-socialist count-
ries only 10% of their population lives in democracy. Primary characteristics of autocracy are the 
following: governments cannot be replaced via civilised and peaceful procedures, institutions 
that should provide conditions needed for the government’s replacement  exist only formally 
and their influence is very weak, parliamentary opposition does exist but its functioning is very 
much jeopardised by the use of  different instruments of repression (imprisonment through false 
allegations, or even politicaly motivated murders). Secondary characteristics of autocracy are the 
following: Represive means are used against parliamentary opposition, institutions functioning 
as ‘’check and balances’’ are weak and non-independent, the ruling political group appoints its 
own cadres to virtually all important offices, No legal constraints against civil protest; weak civil 
society, there are legal frameworks for participation but they are practically not applied, freedom 
of the press is constrained by legal and economic means. (Kornai  2017b.p.259.).
Ten years ago, nine out of 29 transitional countries functioned in the state of consolida-
ted democracy while five of those functioned in consolidated authoritarain regimes. (https://
freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit-2017). Presently the number of count-
ries with authoritarian regimes rose up to eight, while the number of those with consolidated 
democtratic regimes fall down to seven. In the last ten years the democratic score in Central 
Europe deteriorated much faster then in two other sub-regions, the Balkans and Euro-Asia. 
Independent media and corruption have contributed considerably to such a state of affairs. It is 
estimated that Hungary went through the biggest downfall, while the biggest fall of the democ-
ratic score in the Balkans took place in Serbia, B&H and FRY Macedonia. 
Bustikova L. and Guasti P. (2017) investigate what is rotten in the new democracies of Central 
Europe. Liberal-democratic project in Visegrad Four (the Chech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia) has been either stalled, diverted or reversed. They differentiate in between illiberal 
‘’turns’’ and ‘’swerves’’. Hungary is at brink of decisive illiberal turn.
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‘’There are foreign politicans who see Orban as a model ; there is real danger that this con-
tagion, leading to the loss of democracy and of the rule of law, will spread’’.(Kornai 2015.p.14.).4
One of the factors that keeps Orban in power is the fact that he is seen as a defender of 
Hungary’s soveregnty, says Kornai. But ‘’Hungary must be an organic part of Europe: it must 
unambiguously belong to the Western world; it must further strenghten the links binding it 
politically, economically and culturally to the West.’’(Kornai  2015.p.15.).The European Union is 
unprepared for a situation where one of its members keep turning against the value system and 
formal and informal norms of its community. 
Kornai also notices the presence retrograde ideologies  (nationalism, chauvinism, ethnic or 
religious prejudices and a conservative view of the family, wich appear in a variety of shades) that 
are not openly expressed. (Kornai  2015.p.19)
7. Populism and nationalism
The common theme of countries that have undergone the transition is the increasing emergence 
of populism. This question becomes relevant even in Western Europe. Kornai’s reflections on 
populism are very inspiring. It is very easy to relate his assessments, views and conclusions to the 
cases of the Western Balkan countries. As well as there is some regularity in that domain.
Changes on the global level have lead to the transition of the former socialist countries but 
quite expectedly and now they are very much affecting these countries. „The consequences 
of the process of transition reach far out of the domain of economy into the domain of the 
political organisation, as well as into various social institutions, and at the same time affecting 
society’s systems of values“. Many important questions have not been resolved and answered. 
‘’Throughout the socialist world the fight for the issues of social homogeneity, individuation and 
inequality is widespread. On one hand there are politicans that fight for pluralism in politics, 
individualism and social diferentiation, believing that these values  lead towards progressive 
European future, while on the other hand, the right-hand, nationalists strongly oppose those 
values’’. (Verderi  2005. p. 461.) We are of the opinon that such a state is the result of  populism 
in politics. According to certain authors populism in Serbain politics has been continuously 
present all the way from the end of the nineteenth century. 
4  At the economic summit organised by the German magazine „Die Welt“, Victor Orban states that in case 
Germany does not decide to finance the construction of gas lines and roads in Hungary, they will turn 
towards China with such requests. The response of Bosniacas (Muslims) towards Orban’s politics has been 
very negative. On the other hand, the responses of Bosnian Serbs, on social networks are mostly pro-Or-
ban and supportive of  his politics. A big majority of Serbs support Orban’s political views - his break-up 
of the co-operation with the IMF, the reluctancy to open borders to the Syrian and others refugees , the 
„autonomous“ national  policy seem to be in tune with the Serb public opinion. Orban shows much 
strength and independence in his international politics on the basis of which the citizens of Serbia create 
his image. Their comments on public show their support and respect  with respect to his intenational 
politics. http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/planeta.299.html:705576-ORBAN-PORUCIO-BRISELU-Ako-ne-
mamo-finansijsku-podrsku-EU-okrecemo-se-Kini,   http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/orban-ne-bu-
de-li-sredstava-eu-okrenut-cemo-se-kini
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Populism is a phenomenon wich appears firstly in the ideological sphere of life. (Kornai 
2017.p.1.) Populism is usually associated with nationalism and they are closely correlated.
It is point where Kornai’s understanding of these two current issues differs from the standard 
characterization. 
’’The style of populist …tries to affect the emotions of the audience or readership. Instead of 
calm discourse with opposing views, he creates enemies and mobilize followers to join him in a 
battle, or rather in a series of battles, until it leads to a victory over the hated enemy. He creates 
some kind of mass hysteria’’. (Kornai  2017a.p.2.). 
On the peak of the populist-nationalist movement we see the paramount leader. He is a 
charismatic personality. A personal cult of the leader is quit a common attribute of populist 
movement. The twin ideologies, populism and nationalism, can appear under various colors of 
the political spectrum, on the right side of the political arena but also on the left side.
There are signficant differences between such policies according to the situation of the 
country. Economic progress is not constant. Periods in which a country’s economy deteriorates 
create fertile circumstances for the rise of populism. However, economic reforms are not a  gua-
rantee of  political democratization – these do not obligatorily influence one another. (Kornai 
2017a. p.4.)
Populist leaders in Serbia and B&H earn their votes by fervently supporting national interests 
of their respective ethnic groups. Since the national borders of their countries have not been yet 
clearly defined, this has been a very sensitive issue.5
The collective emotion is the key factor that populism uses and on the basis of which it 
strengthens its power. This collective emotion negates individuality and pluralism in politics. 
(Stojanović  2017.)  Populist movements always speak on behalf of the whole nation. The ability 
to stay  out of it and think differently is not possible. Here, it should be pointed out, that „the 
modernisers“ see Serbia through the glasses of the ideal democracy. They put the ideals of fre-
edom, democracy and human rights against the picture of Serbia that has been humiliated and 
destroyed in every possible way and its every segment. In the public discourse we come across 
„the first kind“ of Serbia: nationalist, rural, conservative and primitive  and  ’’the second kind’’ 
of  Serbia: civilised, clean, urban and aspiring towards modernisation. ’’The first kind’’ of Serbia, 
rather understandably,  insists on the importance of the national identity and the protection of 
its national interets that have been severely jeopardised.  
In its essence, nationalism is observed as being anti-democratic and it is always accompanied 
with negative conotations. Recent war in the region resulted in millions of refugees and displa-
5  Serbian leader is  an ’’authentic’’ representative of its people and its voice that  „protects“ them  from the 
corruped elite, tycoons, foreign intelligence services, inner and outer enemies. (Jovanović 2017.) The go-
vernment of Aleksandar  Vučić  has, at one point of its functioning, started a large anti-corruption campa-
ign, which seemed to have had a strictly defined programme. However, its results seem to be insignificant. 
Older important and unsolved cases, such as the case of twenty-four unlawful privatisaitions, on whose 
solving insisted the EU,  were overshadowed by newly opened cases.  Such cases have not been solved yet 
and many who were involved in these cases seem to be  the close associates of  Vucic, according to the 
words of Jelisaveta Vasilic, the member for the Council for the Action against Corruption. (Preradović 
2014.) It seems that Serbia, unavoidably, slides down towards a one-party regime, and in this historically 
backward movement it goes back to the kind of regime that is recognisable by the name of its main ruler. 
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ced persons, as well as in high rates of unemployment - 40% of the unemployed in B&H and 13% 
in Serbia,  all of which contribute to the huge rise of nationalism in the region. The  question is 
what the alternative is  that political parties could offer instead of nationalism.  Certain attemps 
to introduce a certain degree  of modernisation have not been readily accepted by the region’s 
population. They are usually rejected an seen as a kind of  threat, or even a kind of punishment 
that has to be endured.  Recent ethnic wars make the whole situation even more complex. Rather 
extreme nationalism that caused them and resulted from them cannot be underestimated. 
A specific phenomenon related to the countries of Western Balkans, as well as those of Central 
and Eastern Europe, lies  in the fact that they lagged considerably behind in the process of the 
formation of national states, which is why their ethnic and national borders did not conicide 
with their historical borders. In other words, states were formed only after nations were consti-
tuted. That is why the borders between them remained fluid and fuzzy. ’’This very phenomenon 
became the source of  hysteria of Central and Eastern European nations, i.e. it created such a 
climate in which  permanent fear for the (national) community became dominant, and nation, as 
the main value, took its place even above freedom.’’ (Vegel  1996. p.7.) Freedom and democracy 
run their course independently from the nation, but they can also take conflicting positions. 
Therefore, political regimes in these countries historically swing between extreme dictatorship 
and anarchy, various kinds of populism and ideal totalitarianism. Fragility of democracy within 
such a context stems out of the fact that democracy is closely related to national values. In this 
context freedom can be marginalised, too. Therefore, post-communist nationalism should not 
be seen as an accidental outcome. Bibó István  points out to the fact that lives of minorities are 
not easy even if  pressures exerted upon them are not  direct and visible. In the  „The Law of 
Peoples“ John Rawls puts and accent on  demos, while  Bibó  puts it on ethnos taking Central 
European hysteria as a starting point.  Bibó  traces  the causes of the crises back to the unresolved 
national issues which are deeply rooted in history and which do not come up to the surface in 
a voluntary fashion. Therefore Bibó  does not reject the  existence of  national states and their 
democratic potential.  (Vegel 1989. p. 9.)
President of  Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, follows diligently directives of the IMF  by implemen-
ting austerity measures in the public sector - via employment,  salaries and pensions reductions, 
etc. He is perceived as the main „implementer“ of  reforms based on  the IMF’s directives. At the 
same time, his ruling party (SNS) controls the leading and the most influential public media in 
Serbia. His party provided for itself a huge number of supporters all over the country and in all 
of its social structures. According to the sociologist, Jovo Bakić (2017),  in spite of the fact that, 
according to the studies, a vast majority of the citizens of Serbia do not trust politicians and poli-
tical parties, SNS has got around 700.000 members and “interest-motivated members“, which 
means that every tenth citizen of the country is a member of the ruling party. The main aim of its 
voters is to enter in public institutions, municipalities and public services. They vote for ruling 
parties neither because they believe in their ideas and programmes (which those usually lack), 
nor to contribute to the well-being of the society (whose importance they are not aware of), but 
mainly because of their personal material interest and careers.  It is important to create such a 
climate in which majority of  citizens believe that they cannot make considerable changes via 
elections, in this way making  the ruling party  feel invincible. It is also a rather well-known fact 
that the opposing parties, that once used to be the ruling ones, do not much differ in this reg-
ard from the ones who are currently in power.( http://www.bezcenzure.rs/2018/01/19/jovo-ba-
kic-bez-dlake-na-jeziku-o-diktatorskom-rezimu-vucic-i-njegove-hijene-rastrgli-su-srbiju/)
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Without having any concrete and systematic idea of the country’s economic progress, apart 
from being focused on how to attract foreign investments that are hugely  „subsidized“  from 
the state’s budget, the attempt of the leader to motivate his citizens by protestant work ethics and 
ideals, seems to be ridiculous.  (Petrović 2017.) Such attempts to motivate his citizens to work 
more diligently implies that Serbs are lazy. It is clear that work is important, but it is also clear 
that many kinds of work do not result in material benefits - only a productive kind of work for 
which many pre-conditons need to be provided first.  
During 80’s macroeconomic planning  in developed countries is being abandoned, while 
liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation are being on rise. In socialist countries the 
compromise of macroeconomic planning was the reason why this economic model was totally 
abandoned. It is true that the ideology of the liberal market contributed to it, as well as the 
economic concept and model that were suggested to the transitional countries by internatio-
nal financial  institutions.  This is how economic planning has disappeared altogether and has 
been replaced by structural reforms. Together with this, institutions that dealt with economic 
planning have been extinguished, too. In this way, state with own economic policy that acted 
correctively,  stopped functioning  and supplementing   the market mechanism through which 
one important aspect or, at least, a small part, of the economic sovereignty was expressed. 
(Bukvić  2004.p. 116.) 
One of the results of the process of globalisation is reduction of the power of (national) 
governments to create and influence the economic and social future of their respective count-
ries.  This is especially related to the countries labelled as „transitional loosers“ which very tend 
to seek culprits for their economic failure in neoliberalism, globalisation and free trade, that are 
blamed for narrowing the space within which they could develop their own productive capa-
cities  and in this way employ the sufficient amount of working power. This has also influen-
ced the rise populism in politics and fervent  insisting of the national economic sovereignty in 
those countries.  They blame the policy of  ’’heavy budget constraints’’  wich balances public 
and state’s budget on behalf of vulnerable social groups and slows down solving of the unemp-
loyment problem.  Foreign investments seem to be the last economic resort and therefore the 
state (Serbia) spends a considerable amout of their budget resources in order to stimulate and 
encourage such investments (co-finacing the opening of new working places).  For these reasons, 
foreign investments are being tolerated, while at the same time foreign investors enter the zone 
of moral hazard by assuming they  have such a right because of the high risk which is related to 
investing in such countries .  In additon, local politicians use foreign investments as the result 
of their very own efforts used to attract them, on the basis of which they earn greater political 
reputation and new voters.  
In general, local investments are insignificant and incapable of providing adequate economic 
growth rate , which, according to the estimates of the local experts, it should be around five per-
cent on a yearly basis. At the moment, those rates are half as big as those that could provide the 
economic growth, according to which they could reach the level of the economic developement 
of  the EU countries only in the following 50 years. Due to the catastrophic politicies of the ruling 
political parties the question is if political elites could really take the responsibility for the econo-
mic growth in those countries  and if they could do anything concrete that would speed up the 
rates of economic growth and employment, in other words – could they be capable for leading 
proactive economic policies. (Plakalović  2017.) 
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Conclusion
Kornai is an economist who deals with economic problems in an all-encompassing manner by 
always placing them within a wider social, ideological, political, historical, geostrategical  and 
other contexts that contibute considerably to the overall and deeper undersatnding of the issues 
in question. 
Therefore, by following his steps, we tried to give, at least, a partial insight into the issues that 
are related to the process of transition that he  seds light on, in some of his important works. We 
have been always fascinated and inspired by his thinking with regard to the phenomena that 
have been common among the socialist countries back in their days, and as equally so now, when 
most of those countries have been and are going through the process of transition. His enormous 
knowledge in the field of  economy, his all-encompassing approach to its issues, his very deep 
insight and knowledge of his own country, put him in a position to be able to give proper and 
valuable diagnoses related  both to the times of communism, as well as to those of tranisiton 
towards a free market economy.
Even though Kornai himself once said that the process of transition was over, the actual 
reality points out to the fact that this process is not over in case we chose to see  „The Great 
Transformation“ in its completness, since it cannot be reduced down to the economic reforms. 
It also involves crucial social changes which are of even greater importance.  Privatisation pro-
cedures themselves  and the implementation of the democractic minimum, to which the present 
circumstences testify, especially the very obvious U-turn in most of the transitional countries, 
confirm exactly  that without the „Great Transformation“ in the social domain (ideology, politics, 
society)  the process of transiton cannot be completed.  Finally, Kornai speaks about a long-
term process since a few decades are not sufficent enough to provide us with full and complete 
conclusions and tangible results, which means that the process is still not close to its „completion 
point“.
Transition has been observed from a strictly economic point of view. Ownership transfor-
mation of property  have been more or less implemented, however  the questions related to the 
rule of law, improvement of  a regime that efficiently guarantees the protection of property rights 
and  development of its institutions are still very much open and seem to be at the beginning of 
a very long evolutionary road.  In the meantime, a big number of informal institutions that are 
deeply rooted in history and culture exert a huge influence over the development of the countries 
in question. Those informal institutions are ruled by various interest groups whose rule is based 
in corruption and which exist in the form of political parties.
Starting from the Kornai analysis of the transition process in the sphere of institutional 
development, rule of law, politics, populism and nationalism in Hungary, we have noticed the 
emergence, if not the same then very similar phenomena and trends in Serbia and B&H. This is 
especially true in the areas of the rule of law, the role of politics in society, corruption, populism 
and nationalism. Although the transition processes in the Western Balkan countries were much 
more traumatic than in other Eastern Bloc countries, many current problems in the economy, 
especially in society and politics, are present in other former socialist countries. This may point 
to the conclusion that there is a certain pattern in these processes that may well be linked to a 
past, common tradition of socialism.
Therefore, the process of transformation, as based on our experiences, cannot be seen solely 
through the structural reforms and the change of the formal rules (laws and regulations) but it 
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requires to be implemented through a long process of the institutional development. In the same 
way, this process cannot be completed  through the simplistic adoption of  western rules and 
procedures. Transiton is a  generationaly long  process.
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